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The Enron episode currently playing on center-stage in Washington teaches 
important lessons. For most commentators (including learned academic ones), the 
issues requiring Congressional scrutiny start with internal managers' responsibility for 
directing their firms, and continue with external auditor surveillance of inside 
management. Shortcomings traced to inside management and outside audits then are 
said to require federal-government correction. 
 
That perspective is all wrong, however. Enron does have lessons to teach, but 
not those. There are five lessons, in fact, culminating with the most instructive one of 
all: how supposed "crises" benefit opportunistic politicians. 
 
Start with the first lesson: stuff happens. Firms fail all the time —our 
bankruptcy laws create incentives to take more risk on the front end, with the 
knowledge that courts will sort out problems created by risk-taking that proves 
excessive after the fact. Albeit the most spectacular, Enron was but one of a record 
number of bankruptcies last year. 
 
True, as Enron demonstrates, failures don't just happen randomly. Directors 
may direct negligently; managers may manage to benefit themselves rather than the 
firm and its shareholders. Likewise, outside auditors may be negligent, or succumb to 
conflicts of interest. 
 
But (second lesson) there are laws in every state that regulate these sorts of 
problems, under which shareholders have legal recourse. The legal "duty of care" 
requires that directors do their jobs, for which they are well paid. When directors fail 
in that duty, shareholder class actions (so-called "derivative" suits) are available for 
redress. Likewise, if auditors have breached their contract to audit competently, they 
are liable to the firm hiring them and to investors they know will rely on their audits. 
 
Were all this not so, corporate directors and auditing firms would not carry 
insurance —which they do. Were this not so, Arthur Andersen would not have offered 
Enron shareholder and creditor groups three quarters of a billion dollars to settle 
foreseeable litigation. (Since this was an initial offer, any final settlement predictably 
will cost Arthur Andersen more than that.) 
 
Moreover, the incentive system at work among lawyers ensures that injured 
shareholders will have their day. The plaintiff bar does not miss alleged corporate or 
auditor misconduct, as the Enron saga has certainly demonstrated. Lawyers have lined 
up, competing for the lucrative right to represent Enron shareholders. When managers 
fail to perform because of conflict of interest rather than just mistake, as was allegedly 
the case for some of Enron's management, the legal rules make plaintiff recoveries 
relatively easy. That in turn increases plaintiffs' incentive to sue and fans lawyers' 
ardor to round up plaintiffs. 
 
By law, further, recoveries will come from the personal wealth of those who 
fell short or had conflicting interests. So, if money was improperly siphoned from 
corporate coffers to personal pockets, Enron's lack of funds would not matter. The 
money, or the assets purchased with the money, is still there. Enron's directors and 
officers are not paupers. Also, if they or their auditors have deliberately deceived 
creditors and stockholders, they have committed crimes, and can be prosecuted and 
imprisoned for them. 
 
In other words, practically nothing about the Enron episode raises new issues. 
Firms fail —no one can legislate away investor risk. To the extent that failure is due 
to misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or shortcomings in anything else that 
shareholders had a right to expect from their management-agents, shareholders 
already have legal recourse. Ditto for creditors. As The Naked Gun's Leslie Nielsen 
would say, "just keep moving...nothing interesting here." 
 
Which raises a third, crucial lesson. Not only are shareholders already 
protected legally, but in the American legal system they are protected by state law. (I 
have not read of any Congressional committee evaluating the laws already protecting 
Enron shareholders, have you?) Although Ralph Nader and others tried hard to 
federalize corporate law in the 1960s and 1970s, nothing of the sort resulted. Just as 
there is no federal law of contracts, or federal law of property, there is no national 
corporate law. Similarly, any criminal fraud here is covered by existing state law. 
(There is a national system of securities regulation, but the Enron story is not about 
securities violations other than those already illegal by standards of traditional state-
law fraud.) 
 
So why all these klieg lights and reporters in Washington? Well, because a 
newsworthy event without him in the news makes a politician shudder. You can call 
Senators and Congressmen anything you want...just don't call them late for dinner. If 
need be, they'll host the dinner. Washington's elected suits can always call hearings, to 
which television brings its lights, flames to which reporters then are drawn. 
 
So welcome to Congress's Enron dinner. Is there any major problem lacking a 
current remedy for which Washington could plausibly offer a solution? No. But if you 
stage a hearing, they will come. 
 
Lesson Four, then: even if there is nothing constructive for Washington to do, 
it strives to create the illusion of doing something, as long as somebody is paying 
attention. All of this happens because of the property rights in the legislative system. 
If Congressman Snort heads a committee and wants a hearing, he gets it. Congress has 
lots of Snorts and plenty of committees. 
 
At first, all this seemed more pitiable than harmful. A successful politician 
needs steady publicity-vide or ergo sum —and before Enron it had been a while 
between fixes. The war against the Taliban wasn't cutting it —raise your hand if 
you're against the Bush push into Afghanistan —and air time for Congress was paltry 
compared to that for the commander-in-chief. What's the harm in skewering a few 
rich Texans who fell down on the job, maybe even criminally? 
 
Not much perhaps, if the issue is just Enron. But that's the fifth, critical lesson. 
Enron is not about Enron. Congress's real goal is saddling the political system with 
new campaign finance laws, and Enron provides an excuse to re-ignite enthusiasm for 
the cause. Enron is a pretext, but one that offers a great political opportunity. 
 
After the Bush election, recall, campaign "reform" was a headline-grabber 
until September 11, after which media interest in the issue deflated. With the media 
looking elsewhere, Congress lost interest also. But with the media back to cover 
Enron, Congress now hopes to ratchet the good-guy/bad-guy stories about one firm's 
finances and political contributions into a cry for national campaign legislation. 
 
The political strategy of converting past tragedies into unrelated legislation is 
not new. President Kennedy's death begot Great Society programs. Ironically, many 
of the supposed "soft money" campaign-finance problems now said to need reforming 
arise from Congressional legislation in the wake of Watergate. 
 
Enron is just the latest opening that a newsworthy story offers to opportunistic 
politicians, even when they can't do much about the underlying events or problems. 
Of course, there is no joy when investors take a bath —is anybody in favor of a 
Fortune 100 company cratering? But Enron itself is yesterday's water under the 
bridge. As politicians circle the Washington sky over Enron's remains, the issue is not 
what they will do today for corporate shareholders. There is nothing that needs doing 
nationally. The question is whether a crafty Congress can use Enron tomorrow to 
snatch back the chance for campaign legislation that seemed lost just months ago. 
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